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ABSTRACT 
Sweatshop labour is sometimes defended from critics by arguments that stress the 
voluntariness of the worker’s choice, and the fact that sweatshops provide a source of 
income where no other similar source exists. The idea is if it is exploitation—as their 
opponents charge—it is mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation. This defence 
appeals to the non-worseness claim (NWC), which says that if exploitation is better for the 
exploited party than neglect, it cannot be seriously wrong. The NWC renders otherwise 
exploitative—and therefore morally wrong—transactions permissible, making the 
exploitation of the global poor a justifiable path to development. In this paper, I argue that 
the use of NWC for the case of sweatshops is misleading. After reviewing and strengthening 
the exploitation claims made concerning sweatshops, most importantly by refuting certain 
allegations that a micro-unfairness account of exploitation cannot evaluate sweatshop labour 
as exploitative, I then argue that even if this practice may seem permissible due to benefits 
otherwise unavailable to the global poor, there remains a duty to address the background 
conditions that make this form of wrong-doing possible, which the NWC cannot 
accommodate. I argue that the NWC denies this by unreasonably limiting its scope and is 
therefore incomplete, and ultimately unconvincing. 
Keywords: Exploitation, sweatshop, 
RÉSUMÉ 
Le travail « à la sueur » est parfois défendu contre les critiques par des arguments qui 
soulignent le caractère volontaire du choix du travailleur, et le fait que les ateliers clandestins 
constituent une source de revenus dans un contexte où aucune autre source similaire n’existe. 
L'enjeu est de savoir s’il s’agit d'exploitation, comme leurs adversaires le soulignent, ou s’il 
s’agit d'exploitation mutuellement bénéfique et consensuelle. Cette défense indique que si 
l'exploitation est meilleure pour la partie exploitée, il ne peut s’agir d’un mal sérieux. 
L'exploitation est donc moralement autorisée, ce qui fait de l'exploitation des pauvres un 
chemin justifiable au niveau mondial pour le développement. Dans cet article, je soutiens 
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que l'utilisation de ce type d’argument est trompeuse. Après avoir examiné le cas de 
l'exploitation dans les ateliers de misère, en réfutant certaines allégations selon lesquelles la 
micro-injustice ne peut servir à évaluer l’exploitation du travail dans ces ateliers, je défends 
l’idée que, même si cette pratique peut sembler admissible en raison de prestations autrement 
inaccessibles au pauvres, il reste un devoir de répondre aux conditions de fond qui rendent 
cette forme de mauvaise conduite possible. Je soutiens que le type d’argument 
conséquentialiste développé pour défendre l’exploitation est finalement peu convaincant. 
Mots clés : Exploitation,  sweatshop 
JEL Classification : J82 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Perhaps the most common objection made against low-wage (sweatshop) labour1  is that the 
owners and operators – often large multi-national enterprises (MNEs) and their 
subcontractors2 – wrongly exploit their workers and the desperate situation they find 
themselves in. Low pay, long hours, and hazardous conditions can combine with impressive 
corporate profits to give intuitive appeal to the exploitation claim, which will be refined 
below. In defence of sweatshops, however, it is sometimes stressed that they are often the 
best option available to their employees, and that this is signalled by the workers voluntarily 
accepting the job’s conditions over work in another setting, or unemployment. It is argued 
that to take any action that might remove this option from the potential workers, such as 
boycotts or stronger regulations, can plausibly be considered harming them rather than 
helping them, if it puts jobs at risk. 
While there are far too many questions raised by sweatshops for me to cover in a single 
paper – with many being empirical – my focus here will be on the exploitation claim and its 
moral significance. There is, however, debate within the exploitation literature about the 
concept’s applicability for the case of sweatshops. It is within this debate that my paper is 
situated. 
In this paper, I argue for two main claims. First, in Part 2 I address a recurring criticism that 
micro-fairness approaches to exploitation cannot adequately account for background 
                                                 
1
 Low wages are but one of the more common conditions associated with “sweatshops,” which is itself 
a difficult term to define fully. In this paper, however, I rely mostly on the common understanding of 
the term, which includes low wages, dangerous working conditions, and long hours with sometimes 
unpaid overtime. For more detail, see Ellen Israel Rosen, Making Sweatshops: The Globalization of 
the U.S. Apparel Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), Ch. 2; Naomi Klein, No 
Logo (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2009), especially Ch. 9; and Denis G. Arnold and Laura P. Hartman, 
“Worker Rights and Low Wage Industrialization: How to Avoid Sweatshops,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 28.3 (2006): 676-700. 
2
 MNEs do not usually operate their own factories overseas, rather they contract out to local 
enterprises. For an account of what this means in terms of responsibility, see Iris Marion Young, 
“Responsibility and Global Labor Justice,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 12.4 (2004): 365-388; 
and Norman E. Bowie with Patricia H. Werhane, Management Ethics (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2005), Ch. 5. 
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injustices and are for this reason unable to evaluate sweatshops as exploitative. This is often 
taken as justification for embracing a macro-fairness account. I argue, however, that this 
criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the micro-fairness approach and its intent. In 
doing so, I also highlight a troublesome defect of the macro-fairness views that gives us 
reason to resist their adoption. 
Having strengthened the case that sweatshops are in fact exploitative, in Part 3 I consider the 
moral force of exploitation claims, that is, what they say we should do about exploitation. In 
particular I examine this in the context of background injustice. I then show how the typical 
defence of sweatshops appeals to what is known as the non-worseness claim (NWC), which 
says that if exploitation is better for the exploited party than neglect, and neglect is itself a 
permissible option, then exploitation cannot be seriously wrong.3 Sweatshop exploitation, 
then, would be considered a justifiable path to development for many countries. I argue, 
however, that the NWC implicitly endorses a minimalist view of responsibilities, one that I 
see as inadmissible in the case of sweatshops because of its problematic dismissal of 
background injustice. To endorse this view, as defenders of sweatshops do when they use the 
NWC, is to ignore rather than respond to the complaint of exploitation, or so I will argue. 
First, however, in Part 1, I summarize the area of agreement concerning the concept of 
exploitation as it is now usually discussed. This will include a description of mutually 
beneficial and consensual exploitation – meaning that harm and coercion are not necessary 
elements of exploitation as I, and most other writers, see it.  
The result of this paper, then, is an analytical separation of micro-fairness accounts of 
exploitation, which in my view are the most defensible, from the minimalist view of 
responsibilities implicit in the NWC, which I argue, at least in the case of sweatshops, is 
morally suspect. In this way I hope to clear up the debate within the exploitation literature 
and locate the points of tension for further inquiry. 
 
PART 1 
 
In the most general sense, for one party, A, to wrongfully exploit another, B,4 means that A 
has taken advantage of B in a way that is somehow unfair or degrading. 5  Nearly everyone 
                                                 
3
 The NWC is first discussed in Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996), 289-293. It is also discussed at length in Matt Zwolinski, “Sweatshops, Choice, and 
Exploitation,” Business Ethics Quarterly 17, no. 4 (2007): 689-727; and for other responses that calls 
its force into question, see Jeremy C. Snyder, “Needs Exploitation,” Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 11, no. 4 (2008): 389-405; and Adam D. Bailey, “The Nonworseness Claim and the Moral 
Permissibility of Better-Than-Permissible Acts,” Philosophia 39, no. 2 (2011): 237-250. 
4
 I will always refer to A as the exploiter and B as the exploited person throughout the paper. 
5
 Exploitation is then a moralized concept; therefore I will drop the modifier ‘wrongfully’ throughout. 
For uses of exploitation in non-moral senses see Richard J. Arneson, “Exploitation,” Encyclopedia of 
Ethics, Ed. Lawrence C. Becker (New York: Garland, 1992); and Joel Feinberg, Harmless 
Wrongdoing, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), ch 31. For unfairness based accounts of 
exploitation, the starting point is Wertheimer, Exploitation. For degradation accounts, which take root 
in Kantian ideas of respect for persons, see Allen W. Wood, “Exploitation,” Social Philosophy and 
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who writes on exploitation can agree to this preliminary definition.6 Where the many 
theories on offer diverge is in their emphasis on either unfairness or degradation as primary, 
and in how they flesh out the details more precisely. Before examining these differences, 
however, the broad area of agreement shared by the majority of these theories should be 
stressed. 
First, it is usually agreed that exploiters must gain from their exploitation; that is, they must 
derive some benefit from their victims. This seems to be the straightforward result of 
understanding exploitation as a form of taking advantage; thus, if there is no advantage 
taken, it is difficult to see how there can be exploitation.7 This feature, the benefit to A, is in 
part what distinguishes exploitation from oppression and other forms of wrongdoing. Alan 
Wertheimer suggests that  “A oppresses B when A deprives B of freedoms or opportunities 
to which B is entitled. If A gains from the oppressive relationship, as when A enslaves B, 
then A may both oppress and exploit B. But there is no reason to think that A always gains 
from oppression, and when A does not gain, there is no reason to regard the oppression as 
exploitative.”8 
Following through with this idea, but turning our attention now to the victims of 
exploitation, it is clearly true that being exploited often means being harmed, understood in 
the sense that one’s interests are set back. This is what happens when A enslaves B. Whereas 
A gains from B’s enslavement, B is clearly harmed. But this is not necessary. For, even if a 
transaction is beneficial for both A and B, it is still possible for it to be somehow unfair or 
degrading, and thus exploitative according to our standing definition. In this way we can 
distinguish harmful exploitation from mutually beneficial exploitation. And while there can 
be little doubt that harmful exploitation such as slavery is morally wrong, the matter is a bit 
more complicated when B gains, and yet the transaction still seems somehow unfair or 
degrading. 
Consider the following examples: 
 
Snowstorm:  A is a tow truck driver who happens along B, a motorist 
stranded in a ditch during a snowstorm. Ordinarily, A charges $10 for 
a simple rescue like this one. But for whatever reason, A offers to only 
assist B for a fee of $200, take it or leave it. B, who we can imagine is 
                                                                                                                                          
Policy 12.2 (1995): 136-158; and Ruth J. Sample, Exploitation: What It Is and Why It’s Wrong 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003). 
6
 Not everyone agrees, of course. Most importantly Marx might disagree, as it is frequently claimed he 
relied on a technical definition of exploitation. For an analysis of this approach to Marx’s account of 
exploitation see Nancy Holmstrom, “Exploitation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7.2 (1977): 353-
369. For an analysis of Marx’s use of exploitation from a moralized perspective see Arneson, “What’s 
Wrong with Exploitation?” Ethics 91.2 (1981): 202-227. 
7
 This, of course, does not mean that in cases where A fails to derive a benefit even though she tries, a 
similar moral wrong might not be applicable. Wertheimer refers to this as A acting exploitatively 
towards B. See Wertheimer, Exploitation, 17, 81, and 209. 
8
 Wertheimer, Exploitation, 18. 
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under no immediate threat, still does not wish to wait for another tow 
truck, decides to pay the $200.9 
 
Overboard: While walking along the deck of a cruise ship, A spots B, 
who has fallen overboard. A offers to throw B a life preserver only on 
condition that she sign away 75% of all her future earnings over to A. 
B, none too thrilled about the terms of this offer, still accepts as she 
nevertheless values her life over the income she trades for it. 10 
 
This last point is worthy of emphasis. While it may strike us as intuitively unfair that B pay 
such a large sum for A’s services, it is just as easy to see that B has nonetheless gained from 
the transaction as compared to her pre-transaction status. Thus harm is not a necessary 
ingredient for exploitative transactions. This also leads us to the further idea that exploitation 
can be fully voluntary, at least in the sense of being free of outright coercion. Insofar as 
exploitation can be mutually beneficial, it is then sometimes rational for B to agree to A’s 
terms, even though unfair. Some writers have denied this aspect of voluntariness and have 
argued that the key, necessary element of exploitation is B’s rationality being 
compromised.11 The overboard example may seem to fall into this category, as B’s 
circumstances hardly put her in the best position to evaluate A’s terms.  
However, it still looks possible to say that given her vulnerable circumstances in both 
Overboard and the milder case of the Snowstorm, compared to the no-transaction option, it is 
in B’s interest to acquiesce to A’s demands, and it might even be irrational for her not to do 
so. I agree with Matt Zwolinski when he says, “[t]o the extent that it is unfair or degrading to 
take advantage of another persons’ vulnerability, then, voluntariness and unfairness are not 
only logically compatible, they will often go hand in hand.”12 This is not to deny that 
difficult situations can put an agent in a precarious position in terms of what she might 
consent to. It is rather that questions of B’s consent hardly end matters, and they solve less 
than they appear to do. 
Suppose B’s car breaks down and she desperately needs a new battery. If A, the only 
mechanic in town, offers to sell B a battery at the same price that she would have paid had 
she gone in better circumstances, at the same price everyone else pays, and at the same price 
she would pay at any other mechanic, this hardly seems like an exploitative transaction and 
B’s arguable compromised consent changes our moral assessment of the transaction very 
little. However, had A recognized B was in such a situation and decided to double the price, 
the charge of exploitation might then seem appropriate. Exploitation, it appears, depends 
more on a defect in the terms of the transaction than on possible defects in B’s consent. 
                                                 
9
 This is adapted from a standard example found in the exploitation literature. See Wertheimer, 
Exploitation, 218; and Sample, Exploitation, 10. 
10
 Adapted from Mikhail Valdman, “Exploitation and Injustice,” Social Theory and Practice 34.4 
(2008): 555; and Zwolinski, “Structural Exploitation,” Social Philosophy and Policy 29.1 
(forthcoming). 
11
 John Lawrence Hill, “Exploitation,” Cornell Law Review 79 (1994): 631-699. 
12
 Zwolinski, “Structural Exploitation.” 
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These defects in consent are certainly not irrelevant, however. Though I should note that 
their importance seems to depend in part on which approach to defining exploitation – 
unfairness or degradation – is taken. On an unfairness model, problems in B’s consent are 
seen to play more of a role in determining how we ought to respond to exploitation, which 
can be defined independently, purely in terms of the outcome of the transaction.13 On the 
approach that exploitation is primarily degrading, defects in consent will carry greater weight 
since the emphasis is more on the process that gives rise to exploitative terms.14 This 
approach can be fleshed out in a number of ways, yet in most cases the intuitive idea is that 
certain transactions are inherently lacking in respect, such as the purchase of  reproductive 
labour, or organs. This, in turn, is usually grounded in Kantian ideas of autonomy and 
respect.15 This approach faces an initial difficulty, however, as one interpretation of Kant’s 
maxim against using one as a mere means suggests one violates this duty only when on treats 
“him in a way to which he could not possibly consent.”16 Cases of coercion and fraud would 
fall under this heading, but as we have seen, there appear to be genuine cases of exploitation 
where B appears to give her full consent, and where it is rational for her to do so. This 
difficulty can of course be overcome, and the work Wood and Sample referenced above is a 
testament to just that. 
Ultimately, however, I am more confident in an unfairness account providing a more 
plausible conception of exploitation. This is largely because of considerations that come 
from the micro- versus macro-fairness debate, which I will turn to below. For now, it can 
simply be noted that at least when it comes to the question of sweatshop labour, degradation-
based approaches can themselves be considered as types of macro-fairness accounts of 
exploitation. And while these have the benefit of having little difficulty describing sweatshop 
labour as exploitative, I will argue that this comes at a high cost. Unfairness models, on the 
other hand, often fall into the category of micro-fairness accounts. These, in contrast, are 
sometimes said to be unable to explain sweatshops as exploitative because they exclude 
certain background information in their moral assessment of transactions. Usually this is 
considered a defect and a reason to abandon the approach—though some writers do embrace 
this conclusion.17 In any case, I will go on to refute the claim that micro-fairness views 
cannot evaluate sweatshops as exploitative. I consider this important because it cuts off those 
who wish to deny that sweatshops are exploitative from using what I see as a common 
misunderstanding of the micro-fairness approach in their favour, and moreover, as the micro-
fairness view is generally considered a more conservative approach, it adds further weight to 
the claim that sweatshops are a genuine case of exploitation, and thus, worthy of further 
moral analysis. 
                                                 
13
 See Wertheimer, Exploitation, Ch. 8. 
14
 Indeed, Robert Goodin claims that exploitation “must necessarily refer to a process rather than 
some end-state.” Robert E. Goodin, “Exploiting a situation and exploiting a person,” in Modern 
Theories of Exploitation, ed. Andrew Reeve (London: Sage Publications,1987), 181. 
15
 This is especially true of Allen Wood, “Exploitation”; and Sample, Exploitation. Sample also ties 
her theory to the more recent development of the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum. 
16
 Christine Korsgaard, “The Reasons We Can Share,” Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1993): 40.  
17
 Zwolinski seems to take this position, most notably in Zwolinsky “Sweatshops, Choice, and 
Exploitation,” Business Ethics Quarterly 17, no. 4 (2007): 689-727. 
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PART 2 
 
Before considering the micro- versus macro-fairness debate, it is worthwhile to add some 
details to the idea that the wrongfulness of exploitation lies primarily in an element of 
unfairness. In any given transaction, each party has a reservation price, “that is, the value that 
the person must receive if he or she is to agree to the transaction.”18 The range in between 
the two parties’ reservation prices (if one exists) is the zone of agreement. Recall the 
snowstorm example. We can imagine that A’s reservation price is the $10 she normally 
charges. Though she would prefer to get more for her efforts, she is unwilling to accept any 
less than that. B’s reservation price will depend more on the situation, and it is probably 
unlikely that B could accurately predict her reservation price until her hand is forced. Let us 
say, in any case, that B’s reservation price is $250. She would rather be stuck in the cold than 
pay such an outrageous fee. Their zone of agreement, then, falls between these two prices – 
between $10 and $250. A transaction that occurs within this zone of agreement can be 
thought to generate a social surplus, “which could be defined as the difference between the 
buyer’s and seller’s reservation prices.”19 It is the distribution of the social surplus that raises 
questions of fairness. In our example, A is able to push B closer to her reservation price 
because of her vulnerable situation, and for this reason gets a larger share of the social 
surplus. Though if B has accurately determined her own reservation price, then it is 
reasonable to suppose that she nonetheless still gains from the transaction. Mutually 
beneficial exploitation, then, occurs when both A and B gain relative to the no-transaction 
baseline but the distribution of the social surplus is somehow unfair to B. While this offers a 
little more precision to the unfairness account of exploitation, it is still entirely unclear what 
makes a given distribution unfair. A principle of fairness is therefore required, and the 
distinction between micro- and macro-approaches can now be examined.20  
While there is no traditional definition that marks the difference between the two 
approaches, Jeremy Snyder suggest that “we can divide fairness-based accounts of 
exploitation into two subgroups: 1) those that do not include concerns about structural justice 
in the standard of fairness (micro fairness); and 2) those that do incorporate concerns about 
structural justice when assessing fairness (macro fairness).”21 The standard example of a 
micro-fairness account comes from Alan Wertheimer. The principle of fairness Wertheimer 
favours for most cases is based on the notion of a hypothetical market price – that is, “the 
price that an informed and unpressured seller would receive from an informed and 
                                                 
18
 Wertheimer, Exploitation, 20. 
19
 Ibid., 21. 
20
 Indeed, Arneson has noted that there are then “as many competing conceptions of exploitation as 
theories of what persons owe each other by way of fair treatment,” “Exploitation,” 350.  
21
 Snyder, “Exploitation and Sweatshop Labor: Perspectives and Issues,” Business Ethics Quarterly 
20, no. 2 (2010): 4-5. 
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unpressured buyer.”22 Though certainly not the only option for a micro-fairness account, I 
will focus on this principle since it has generated substantial debate – especially concerning 
the role of background injustice—and is often invoked in the sweatshop exploitation 
literature as a principle that fails to label sweatshops as exploitative. 
The fairness of the hypothetical market price (HMP) is founded in the idea that the 
competitive market price “is a price at which neither party takes special unfair advantage of 
particular defects in the other party’s decision-making capacity or special vulnerabilities in 
the other party’s situation.”23 We can see the appeal of the HMP if we apply it to our earlier 
examples. Had there been two tow truck drivers competing to assist B, it is likely that neither 
would be able to take advantage of B in the same way as when there was only one. The same 
can be said for Overboard. Once A loses her monopoly position on assisting B, she also 
loses her ability to push B to the exploitative price, and must instead offer fair(er) terms if 
she wishes to transact. This is because in a fully competitive market, it is argued, no one can 
chose to transact at anything but the market price.24 Yet when we say that A takes unfair 
advantage of B, we must mean that A could have decided not to do so—as is usual, ought 
implies can. In this way the HMP reflects the potential for fairness in perfectly competitive 
markets. B might still be the victim of a misfortune or injustice, but if they transact at this 
price, then A herself has not exploited B, and the distribution of the social surplus is 
considered fair. 
Of course, not everyone accepts this criterion of fairness nor the theory of exploitation it 
supports. Ruth Sample criticizes Wertheimer’s theory for being too conservative and for 
understanding exploitation as simply a “failure to adhere to a convention.”25 According to 
Sample, exploitation for Wertheimer essentially means paying a non-standard price. Sample 
in turn argues that sometimes paying a standard price can still be exploitative if proper 
attention is given to background circumstances of the parties, which, she claims, the HMP 
fails to do.  
Consider the following example from Sample that many hold to be an intuitive case of 
exploitation: 
 
A factory worker visits a Pacific Rim country and offers to set up a running-
shoe factory that would pay each worker $2 per day. The current average 
daily wage in the village is $1, which is enough to prevent a worker and his 
family from starving. The workers will have no benefits other than salary and 
must work eighty hours per week. The workers accept. The running shoes 
sell for $95 per pair in the United States and Western Europe, and half of that 
price is corporate profit.26 
 
                                                 
22
 Wertheimer, Exploitation, 230.  While Wertheimer does not suggest this principle applies to all 
cases, he does suggest that it “does provide a plausible conception of a fair transaction at least for a 
certain range of cases.” Ibid. 
23
 Ibid., 232.  
24
 Ibid., 233. 
25
 Sample, Exploitation, 23. 
26
 Sample, Exploitation, 8. 
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Although Sample intended for this to simply be an example that highlights a certain defect in 
the HMP, it does not stray too far from actual conditions in many parts of the developing 
world. Working conditions are often dangerous, with poor ventilation, cramped spaces, and a 
severe lack of safety measures. Typical shifts can last over ten hours a day, six days a week, 
and overtime is commonly forced and unpaid. The majority of the workers are women, and 
sexual harassment is widespread. Efforts by employees to improve conditions through 
protest or unionizing are often met with intimidation, beatings, and firings. Health and other 
benefits are a dream. And while wages are low, typically well below the stated minimum 
wage, they are, as in the example, still higher than the local average wage.27 
Before responding to Sample’s argument in detail, some more general remarks can be made. 
Sample’s own account of sweatshop exploitation is helpful in showing the link between 
macro-fairness accounts and theories of exploitation as degradation. Without going too 
deeply into the details, suffice to say that Sample considers the wrongness of exploitation to 
include cases where we “fail to respect a person by taking advantage of an injustice done to 
him [or her].”28 And while this account ties the wrongness of exploitation to a failure to 
respect rather than to unfairness, and can thus properly be considered a case of exploitation 
as degradation, it is the action of taking advantage of the unfairness created by an injustice 
that constitutes a failure of respect.29 Profiting from sweatshop labour in the face of extreme 
poverty qualifies as an instance of taking advantage of injustice for Sample, and sweatshops 
are then easily evaluated as exploitative on this macro-fairness account. 
Unfortunately, however, it seems that this approach takes us too far. As not only would 
sweatshops be considered exploitative, but so would any business operating in the 
developing world. This is the case because of a distinction that seems largely ignored by 
macro-fairness accounts, but that micro-fairness accounts take very seriously. That is the 
difference between taking advantage of unfairness, and taking unfair advantage of 
unfairness.30 A case of the former might be when a contractor rebuilds a home destroyed by 
arson, but still charges the owner a fair fee. Though the contractor gains from an injustice, it 
might be a stretch to say she is taking unfair advantage of the owner.31 Of course if she were 
to suddenly raise the price to an excessive level, preying on the owner’s vulnerable situation, 
she might then be guilty of taking unfair advantage of unfairness, and thus exploiting the 
owner. But this would be because of an unfairness that manifests in the terms of the 
transaction, and not simply in the background. By linking exploitation so strictly to the idea 
of gaining from injustice, macro-fairness accounts like Sample’s make background injustice 
a sufficient cause for exploitation, yet this does not seem tenable, as benefiting from 
misfortune does not always seem inherently wrong. 
Snyder suggests that a “micro-fairness [account] attempts to limit the scope of the standard 
of fairness, typically by excluding concerns about the effects of structural justice on the 
                                                 
27
 Examples abound, yet for an account of the major problems see Denis G. Arnold and Norman E. 
Bowie, “Sweatshops and Respect for Persons,” Business Ethics Quarterly 13.2 (2003): 221-242. 
28
 Sample, Exploitation, 57. 
29
 Snyder, “Exploitation and Sweatshop Labor,” 9. 
30
 Wertheimer, Exploitation, 298. 
31
 Zwolinski, “Structural Exploitation,” 24-25. 
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distribution of benefits resulting from an interaction.”32 While it may be possible to construct 
a principle of fairness that limits itself in this way—though I do not see how that could be 
considered fair—it is hardly a requirement of the micro-fairness approach. The rationale for 
adopting a micro approach, such as the HMP, is not to purposively ignore any effects of 
structural or background causes as Snyder claims; rather, it aims to have a clearer focus on 
effects by bracketing their cause to an extent. Recall Overboard, in trying to determine if A 
is exploiting the drowning B, it seems to matter very little whether B fell in the water due to 
bad luck, fecklessness, or injustice.33 Unless A pushed B in, of course, the unfairness of A’s 
exploitation then depends more on the desperation of B’s circumstances than its history.34 
This follows straightforwardly from recognizing that just because an agreement arises out of 
an unfair or unjust background, this does not necessarily mean the terms will also be unfair. 
This does not deny, however, that structural injustice or background unfairness might lead an 
agent to accept unfair terms and be exploited, as they most certainly do.35 
In more detail now, Sample’s concern with the HMP lies in the fact that there is undoubtedly 
a competitive market for labour in developing countries, but since there are many more 
workers than capitalists, the price for labour is low. She says that “competitive markets are 
set by supply and demand, and if a person has a monopoly on a resource—such as 
employment – this may drive demand and thus prices up.”36  She then claims that “since the 
competitive market price is the nonexploitative price, it follows that the workers are not 
being exploited.” 
The problem with this argument, however, is clear. Sample conflates the mere existence of a 
market with the conditions of a hypothetical market. This misunderstanding in the way that 
the HMP is meant to abstract away from actual markets is crucial. While Wertheimer is not 
entirely precise in what might define the HMP, he does compare it to the price set by a fairly 
conducted market “in the absence of fraud, monopoly, or coercion.”37 This implies that the 
mere presence of market does not guarantee the standard price is a fair one.38 Though the 
                                                 
32
 Snyder, “Exploitation and Sweatshop Labor,” 5. 
33
 Valdman, “Exploitation and Injustice,” 556. 
34
 If A did push B in, then she is guilty of more than just exploitation. 
35
 It should be noted that much of the support for the claim that micro-fairness accounts would not 
include considerations of background injustice comes from a remark Wertheimer makes concerning 
the applicability of the hypothetical market price as a principle of fair transactions. He says that, “even 
though some fare less well than others by the appropriate principles of social justice, it is unreasonable 
to expect the better-off party to repair those background conditions by adjusting the terms of a 
particular transaction,” Exploitation, 234. However, on one interpretation of this statement, the 
unreasonableness of A correcting for B’s unjust position applies more to the determination of the 
appropriate moral responsibilities arising from the transaction, and less to the question of whether it is 
unfair or not. An important lesson from Wertheimer’s book is the need to separate questions of the 
moral fact of exploitation from questions of its moral force. Later in the book he goes on to say, 
“[e]ven if A does not act wrongly if A fails to voluntarily repair background injustices to B, it may be 
quite wrong for A to engage in an unfair transaction with B,” Ibid., 289. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Wertheimer, Exploitation, 231. 
38
 Elsewhere, Wertheimer says of the hypothetical market price standard: “On this view, there is no 
independent standard of a ‘just price’ for goods such as a shovel or a kidney, nor need we accept 
whatever the actual market yields, given the market’s sundry imperfections. Rather, we evaluate the 
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market for labour in the developing world is competitive in a certain sense, with potential 
labourers competing for employment, in another it drifts close, as Sample acknowledges, to a 
monopoly. And as we have seen, the monopoly position is crucial for many cases of 
exploitation. 
However, it is not strictly true that the labour market in developing countries is a monopoly. 
Moreover, the HMP cannot simply be the perfectly competitive market price in a strict sense 
either, as this would mean any and all profits are exploitative. The HMP is then vague with 
respect to exactly what features of actual markets it abstracts away from. Yet, in any case, it 
is important to recognize that exploitation on the HMP view is not simply a matter of paying 
a nonstandard price, as Sample characterizes it. Even in the presence of an accepted market 
price, exploitation can still occur when the terms are sufficiently unlike the terms of a 
hypothetical market, whatever that may be.39 
Thus, while it is true that critics of sweatshop labour tend to not to make their case based 
solely on intuitions regarding the unfairness of cheap labour, but rather on the unfairness of 
certain contingent facts about  global poverty and international trade as it is currently 
practiced – such as commodity dumping, forced liberalization, unfavourable labour laws, 
basic needs deprivation, etc.40 – the claim is perhaps best understood as criticizing the 
influence these factors can have on the terms sweatshop workers might agree to. Background 
and structural unfairness can clearly create the conditions for exploitation. And even though 
a micro-fairness account is concerned with the terms, and not necessarily the circumstances, 
of the transaction, it should not be surprising when structural unfairness leads to unfair 
terms. In this way we can consider unjust background conditions as not sufficient for 
exploitation, but as playing an evidentiary role. Consequently, it is quite plausible that even 
on a micro-fairness account such as an HMP, desperate sweatshop workers are pushed 
towards their reservation prices and are therefore exploited.41 There is then no need to 
                                                                                                                                          
parties’ gains by what they would have received under relatively perfect market conditions, just as we 
may try to determine the ‘fair market value’ of a home by what the home would sell for under 
relatively perfect market conditions in that locale.” “Exploitation,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, (Stanford: The Metaphysics Research Lab, 
Centre for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, 2008). 
39
 For an important contribution to the analysis of micro-fairness accounts of exploitation, and one that 
leads to the conclusion that considerations of competition alone are not enough to inform us to the 
fairness of a transaction, see David Miller, “Exploitation in the Market,” in Modern Theories of 
Exploitation, ed. Andrew Reeve (London: Sage Publications,1987), 156. 
40
 These features and the effects they have on the global poor are frequently discussed in the global 
justice literature. For a variety of accounts on the subject see Peter Singer, One World: the Ethics of 
Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), esp. ch 3; Thomas Pogge, World Poverty 
and Human Rights (Malden: Polity Press, 2002); Onora O’Neill, Faces of Hunger: an Essay on 
Poverty, Justice and Development (London: Allen & Unwin Publishers, 1986); Darrel Moellendorf, 
“The World Trade Organization and Egalitarian Justice,” Global Institutions and Responsibilities: 
Achieving Global Justice, Ed. Christian Barry and Thomas Pogge (Malden: Blackwell, 2005), 141-
158. 
41
 I do not mean to suggest that I could describe what the hypothetical market price for labour in the 
developing world might be in this short piece. Rather I merely suggest that a strong case has been 
presented for the plausibility of the actual terms falling short of this standard, whatever it happens to 
be, without claiming that an unjust background necessarily implies exploitation. 
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abandon the micro-fairness account in favour of a troublesome macro-approach. And 
moreover those who deny sweatshops are exploitative will need to provide a novel and 
convincing argument for why the effects of background factors on the terms of the 
transaction should be ignored, though I do not see how they could.42 
 
PART 3 
 
Exploitation in our sense is a moralized concept. Exploitative transactions are morally wrong 
because they are unfair or degrading. Yet, regardless of which model of exploitation we 
endorse, correctly calling a practice exploitative hardly puts an end to all moral matters. In 
the above, I argued that micro-fairness accounts of exploitation are capable of evaluating 
transactions occurring against a backdrop of unfairness as themselves unfair, even while 
maintaining their focus on transactions in and of themselves. However, as I will soon 
explain, this alone does not determine how we ought to respond to exploitative transactions. 
In this section I will argue that the assessment of the permissibility of exploitative 
transactions requires a more direct reference to background factors that the mere 
determination of exploitation alone does not. Moreover, I will argue that a frequent and 
common defence of sweatshops fails to meet this requirement in a sufficient way. First, 
however, it is useful to analyse the moral force of exploitation claims in more detail. 
We have already seen some cases of exploitation that intuitively ought not to be prohibited. 
In Overboard, it is unlikely that prohibiting the transaction between A and B would be the 
appropriate or desired solution. While it may be unfair that B pay so much for A’s 
assistance, it does not appear as though forbidding A from exploiting B necessarily helps 
matters. Similarly for the Snowstorm example. That exploitation ought to be sometimes 
permitted should be no big surprise, as our focus throughout has been on mutually beneficial 
and consensual exploitation. Both respect for B as a decision maker, and an interest in B’s 
welfare can lead us to this answer. What may be surprising, however, is how unjust 
background conditions may seem to strengthen this idea.  
Considering that B finds herself in already unjust circumstances, there are substantial risks 
involved in ignoring the benefits to B in our moral assessment. If there is the risk that A will 
not offer fair terms to a desperate B, then to deny B the chance to improve her situation by 
being voluntarily exploited is akin to kicking someone while they are down. 
                                                 
42
 One option, favoured by libertarians, is to limit exploitation to transactions that are either 
involuntary or rights violating. Zwolinski occasionally favours such an account. However, even this 
may not be as conclusive as initially supposed. According to article 23 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, “(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. (2) Everyone, without any 
discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. (3) Everyone who works has the right to just 
and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human 
dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. (4) Everyone has the 
right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.” 
(http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr). Thus, even on a rights-based account, there is still a plausible 
case to be made that sweatshops are exploitative. 
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It is a result of these considerations that sweatshop exploitation is often put forward as a 
justifiable path to development. New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof makes this point 
clear when he says “the central challenge in the poorest countries is not that sweatshops 
exploit too many people, but that they don’t exploit enough.”43 This defence of sweatshop 
labour embodies what is called the non-worseness claim (NWC), which states that if it is 
morally acceptable for A not to transact with B, then A’s mutually beneficial and consensual 
exploitation of B cannot be seriously wrong, and should be permitted. In one form or 
another, the NWC lies at the core of most defences of sweatshop labour, and it is easy to see 
why. Clearly no business is truly obligated to open factories in the developing world, and, 
when combined with the plausible idea that a bad job is better than no job, this suggests that 
sweatshop labour is indeed justified according to the NWC. 
Matt Zwolinski explicitly endorses the NWC in his analysis of exploitation and 
sweatshops.44 He argues that the NWC generates a claim of non-interference, barring any 
efforts that aim to render sweatshop labour a non-permissible option. This is meant to 
include consumer boycott groups, non-government organizations, governments themselves, 
and any others who claim that their aim is the welfare of sweatshop workers. The argument 
is that when businesses lose the incentive to operate in a developing country and employ the 
workers they do, they will be forced to fire employees or even leave completely, which 
eliminates even the small pay the workers now receive. To criticize MNEs, and argue that 
wages or working conditions should be improved, thus puts workers in harm’s way, as the 
threat of neglect is legitimate and permissible. It is therefore odd, that businesses that choose 
to outsource and provide a benefit to their employees are vilified, whereas businesses that 
produce domestically and offer no aid to the global poor seem to escape all moral 
condemnation. 
On this basis, Zwolinski claims that it is incoherent to criticize MNEs who exploit their 
employees yet still provide them with some benefit, while at the same time refraining from 
criticizing other MNEs who do not outsource and thus provide no benefit. Zwolinski asks, 
“[h]ow, then, can it be permissible to neglect workers in the developing world, but 
impermissible to exploit them, when exploitation is better for both parties (including workers 
who are in desperate need of betterment)?”45 
There is no doubt some truth to the NWC, and many examples of exploitation fit into its 
reasoning well enough. Consider the price-gouging shop owner, who doubles the price of 
shovels when an unexpected snowstorm hits town. While we may still call this transaction 
unfair and exploitative, we may stop short of calling it a serious moral wrong that requires 
intervention, precisely for the reasons the NWC brings forward, that is, neither party’s being 
obligated to transact, plus the benefits each receives if they do. 
Yet it strikes many as odd that the identification of sweatshops as exploitative and therefore 
morally wrong would lead to no significant practical consequences but rather their 
unconditional permissibility, as Zwolinski see it. This is likely because of some of the 
relevant dissimilarities between sweatshops and the above price-gouging example. While 
they both share the common feature of mutually beneficial exploitation, in the case of 
                                                 
43
 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Where Sweatshops Are a Dream,” The New York Times, 14 Jan 2009. 
44
 In Zwolinski, “Sweatshops,” 708-711; and Zwolinski, “Structural Exploitation.” 
45
 Zwolinski, “Structural Exploitation.” 
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sweatshops we are drawn to further features that seem to carry moral weight, such as the 
severity of the potential employee’s desperation and inability to reject the offer – in a much 
greater degree than in the shovel example. The cause of this desperation, moreover, is 
different from an unexpected snowstorm in a significant way, as it stems from injustice.46 
In the previous section I argued that a micro-fairness account of exploitation need not ignore 
the effects of injustice as is sometimes claimed. What I believe does ignore background 
injustice in a troublesome way, however, is the minimalist view implicit in the NWC.47 This 
minimalist view attempts to abstain from difficult questions of justice by limiting its 
attention to the terms of the transaction. Yet, in doing so, it implicitly accepts the status quo 
as the appropriate normative baseline. This is apparent in the NWC’s narrow focus on the 
gains of the parties, and voluntariness – these being the only parameters it is concerned with. 
So long as each party sees some – truly any – gain, and the transaction is sufficiently 
consensual, then all moral questions are answered on this minimalist view.48 What is 
excluded, however, is arguably crucial information including the relative positions of the 
parties and their histories. That this information is necessary for a full and satisfactory 
account of the morality and possible permissibility of exploitative sweatshop transactions 
becomes evident when we consider the relevance of what is excluded by the minimalist 
view. 
While I cannot offer a full defence here, I believe a strong argument can be and has been 
made that the conditions the global poor find themselves in are at least partly the result of 
continued unjust acts of the developed world.49 The strongest reason to support this claim 
rests on the fact that the structure of the global economy has tremendous and often 
detrimental effects on the global poor, and since the developed world is largely able to shape 
this shared institution and practice however it pleases, there is a causal relationship between 
the unjust circumstances sweatshop workers find themselves in and the MNEs and 
                                                 
46
 There are other potential problems with the NWC  beyond the one I bring out in this paper. The 
most obvious being that it ignores the possibility of additional duties we might incur when we choose 
to transact with another individual or group. This difficulty, sometimes termed the Interaction 
Principle, is first addressed in Wertheimer, Exploitation, 289-293; it is also the subject of a critique in 
Snyder, “Needs Exploitation.” The criticism that the NWC proves too much is developed in Bailey, 
“The Nonworseness Claim.” My focus in this paper has been the relationship between exploitation 
claims and background injustice, and have for this reason focused my critique on aspects of the NWC 
that are relevant in this regard . 
47
 I adopt this term from Alex John London, “Justice and the Human Development Approach to 
International Research,” Hastings Center Report 35, no. 1 (2005): 24-37. Though he was primarily 
interested in exploitation in international medical research, I believe his arguments are equally 
applicable to the sweatshop debate. 
48
 The issue of how to define what counts as “sufficiently consensual” is one that is crucially 
important to the sweatshop debate, and the exploitation literature more generally. And while I believe 
many difficult questions might ultimately turn on this issue, they are unfortunately beyond the scope 
of this paper. For this reason my critique of the NWC rests not in its conception of consent, but rather 
in its exclusion of further morally significant features of the practice of sweatshop labour. For an 
extended analysis of the role consent can play in sweatshop exploitation, see Zwolinski, 
“Sweatshops.” 
49
 See Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights; and Pogge, “Eradicating Systemic Poverty: a brief 
for a global resource dividend,” Journal of Human Development 2, no. 1 (2001): 59-77. 
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developed world citizens who benefit from their labour. While it is true that this generates a 
rather wide responsibility shared across many different individuals, I do not believe this 
provides a compelling reason to exclude MNEs from any responsibility, as Zwolinski 
argues.50 Rather, I believe a conception of responsibilities along Iris Marion Young’s notion 
of political responsibility, which outlines a more forward looking set of responsibilities for 
individuals who are more complicit in their unjust structural relationships than strictly to 
blame for them, is more appropriate. 51 Viewing the relevant responsibilities in this way 
helps us move beyond the difficult and complicated task of assigning blame for current 
global injustices, and instead frames the tasks as one of working towards solutions. Young’s 
aim is to extend the notion of responsibility, and therefore those who are to blame will not 
escape blame – or their resultant duties. Yet in addition, less culpable but still complicit 
moral agents are also not ignored. In this way I believe we can move beyond – but not 
dismiss – the task of determining which governments and which MNEs face the most blame 
for a particular injustice, and instead demonstrate the need that everyone involved in an 
unjust structural relationship recognize and take up their political responsibilities.52 
While it is a matter of debate exactly how these considerations should inform novel duties 
and responsibilities, I can think of no compelling reason why these injustices should 
purposely be ignored in any full account of the moral permissibility of sweatshop labour. 
The minimalist view, along with its expression in the use of the NWC as a decisive 
methodological tool, thus appear insufficient for dealing with concerns of exploitation in 
developing countries as it leaves no conceptual room for this issues to even arise.53 
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 See Zwolinski, “Structural Exploitation.” 
51
 For a more detailed account of this conception of responsibilities applied to sweatshop labour, see 
Young, “Responsibility and Global Labor Justice.” 
52
 It is worth repeating that this notion of responsibility is complimentary to the more common, blame-
oriented version. And thus, the task of determining blame and describing duties is not to be ignored. 
As such I believe political responsibility is not the only notion of responsibility vital to the question of 
sweatshop exploitation. However, I do believe it provides a compelling reason why we can extend the 
scope of our critique from not only a condemnation of the sweatshops operated by MNEs originating 
from countries where blame for current conditions is more easily laid, but also to those originating 
from countries like China, who likely have little blame for conditions in African mining countries, yet 
still have a political responsibility to discharge as they are nonetheless a part of an unjust political 
structure that they benefit from. How the responsibilities of these two groups will differ is an 
important and complicated question that needs a much more thorough analysis than I can currently 
provide. 
53
 Note that while I call the NWC a “methodological tool” here, there is the question as to whether the 
minimalist view should properly be considered a methodological choice or a moral stance. If it is 
adopted as a moral stance, then the claim would be that the NWC provides all we need to settle the 
moral questions of sweatshop labour. If it is adopted as a methodological choice, however, one 
possible response to the critique I lay out in this paper would be that the further issues of global justice 
that I point to are not excluded from the moral debate over sweatshops, but rather they are bracketed 
for later, while the particular domain of the individual transaction is addressed. While this conception 
of the minimalist view as a methodological choice seems more sensible, I do not believe it answers 
my critique. This is because of the specific fact that the moral wrong that is being addressed is 
exploitation. And as I argued earlier in this paper, exploitation entails an examination of a 
transaction’s background. This is the case because any principle of fairness requires a reference to 
background context, even if a defect in the background factors is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
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I should note that the preceding reveals a distinction that I believe is of particular theoretical 
importance for the analysis of exploitation. This is the fact that there are then two senses in 
which background injustices can be abstracted away from when assessing potentially 
exploitative transactions: (1) the micro-fairness account of exploitation which simply holds 
that background injustice is neither necessary nor sufficient for exploitation to occur, as it is 
the terms of a transaction themselves which must be unfair for exploitation to occur.  And (2) 
a minimalist view that attempts to abstain from broader questions of justice when 
determining the permissibility of an action, but instead simply accepts the status quo as itself 
just, and in doing so excludes morally relevant information. This latter method of abstracting 
from background injustice, because it is especially concerned with the permissibility of 
actions that occur against a backdrop of injustice yet chooses to ignore facts about this 
injustice, appears significantly suspect for its stated task, either as a moral or a 
methodological position, or so I argued above.  
In appreciating this distinction along with the questions that it raises, the exploitation 
literature as well as the sweatshop debate can move forward by addressing these questions 
more directly, while avoiding the misunderstandings and problematic arguments that I have 
highlighted in this paper. In particular, I hope to have shed some light on a common 
distortion of the micro-fairness account of exploitation, as well as provided a framework 
from which a more powerful critique of the use of the NWC as a decisive argument in the 
case of sweatshops can be made. 
In closing, however, I would like to reaffirm my remark that there is certainly some truth to 
the NWC. And even in full recognition of injustice and the responsibilities that arise, its 
warning should not be ignored. For this reason very few sweatshop critics, including myself, 
recommend simply closing sweatshops by fiat. Rather we must be strategic and perhaps even 
permit some exploitative arrangements if better terms are not quickly forthcoming. I believe 
this follows naturally from the idea that complaints of exploitation are not to be seen as a 
simple call to prohibit the act regardless of the consequences. Rather, they are best seen as a 
call to investigate and address the background circumstances that make the exploitation 
possible. In the case of sweatshops, this leads to the conclusion that the unjust situation of 
developing countries and its origins give rise to responsibilities to correct the injustices and 
improve the background conditions of the workers who make our goods. How to cash out 
these responsibilities is a difficult question, yet that again is no reason why it should be 
ignored. 
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